Reaping the Whirlwind in the Horn of Africa: Kulmiye, Dam-ul-Jadeed & Albion

Introduction

In the Bible, Hosea chastises and warns a morally corrupt and spiritually wayward Israel in the 7^th century BC of the consequences of its apostasy “They sow the wind and reap the whirlwind.”  In this context ‘sowing the wind’ means planting something worthless and foolish, i.e. moral corruption and straying from the path ordained by God, which will inevitably result in suffering His divine wrath, i.e. ‘reaping the whirlwind’.

In modern usage, the phrase “reaping the whirlwind” has come to mean suffering the calamitous consequences of one’s ill-advised actions.  Thus, it is particularly apt to describe the current travails besetting the government of Ahmed Mahmoud Silanyo in Somaliland and the supposedly ‘permanent’ Somali Federal Government (SFG) of Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud in Somalia, which are both suffering severe political setbacks as a result of their own actions and policies.  Further, the phrase is also a pertinent description of the equally ill-considered and near-sighted machinations of the ‘Donor’ Powers directed at the erstwhile Republic of Somalia which are grandiosely, and mendaciously, presented as enlightened ‘policy’ based upon Somali interests.

The Kulmiye Government

The present government lead by Ahmed Mahmoud ‘Silanyo’ came to power in July 2010 after routing the UDUB government of Dahir Riyalle Kahin in Presidential elections that May.  Kulmiye ran a successful campaign that was slick, energetic and media-savvy in its presentation.  Further, capitalising upon the fatigue of the Riyalle administration that had been in office for some eight years and had largely run out of new ideas, Kulmiye promised the people of Somaliland a government that was modern in approach, modest in number, professional in execution and meritocratic in the selection of its office holders.  Little wonder then that an overwhelming majority of the people voted Kulmiye into office.

However, underneath the slick presentation and ‘promise everyone everything’ approach to securing support, the Kulmiye campaign was characterised by a dark underbelly of naked tribalism.  Clans and sub-clans, particularly within the majority Isaaq clan group, were specifically and consciously targeted for exclusionary appeals designed to de-legitimise the ruling party and secure their support.  While a certain level of ‘tribal’ politicking is inevitable in a society where the principal social cleavage and identity is the clan or sub-clan, the 2010 Kulmiye election campaign was easily the most ‘tribal’ experienced in Somaliland since the country recovered its sovereignty in 1991.  This fact, and the Kulmiye government’s role in elevating the primacy of the ‘tribal’ imperative in politics, is evidenced by the plethora of clan meetings, or “shir beleed”, that have been held, and are being held, by different clans and sub-clans since 2011.  This practise, whereby individual clans or sub-clans hold meetings to discuss their political and social interests and how to advance same, harks back to the early 1990s and the clan conflicts of that era.  Indeed, such meetings have not been a feature of Somaliland politics since the democratic constitution was enacted in 1997 inaugurating the era of party politics, and the decline of the shir beleed was considered by many Somaliland and foreign observers and commentators as a significant indicator of the growing maturity of the Somaliland polity.

Immediately after taking office, there coalesced around the President a coterie of relatives/kinsmen, mainly comprising young diaspora expatriates, that controlled access to him with an iron fist.  Many senior cabinet members soon found that in order to gain access to the President they had to navigate an impenetrable maze of Presidency officials and assorted relations, usually with little success.  Conversely, those in the ‘charmed circle’, so to speak, – whether they are businessmen, government officials or ordinary people – could gain access to the President at the drop of a hat!  It is common for heads of government to gather around them a small group of trusted colleagues and advisors to discuss and debate sensitive policy issues, indeed these groups are often called ‘kitchen cabinets’ and Harold Wilson, the crafty Labour Prime Minister of Britain during the late 1960s/early 1970s was a notable aficionado of the kitchen cabinet and used it extensively to the fury of many of his colleagues. However, what we witness in the Somaliland Presidency is not a ‘kitchen cabinet’ that debates and discusses policy alternatives, but rather the operation of a ruling clique within the government that has abrogated solely to itself all executive power and authority.  The fact that this clique is characterised in the main by blood and familial ties to the President and his immediate family serves to accentuate its exclusive and impenetrable nature.

Soon after taking office, the Kulmiye government also embarked upon a concerted and calculated campaign to nullify and obliterate political opposition to its rule.  In the wake of its resounding defeat, UDUB embarked upon an internecine struggle which resulted in its effective collapse, thereby obviating the need for the government to take any action against it.  The other national party, UCID, had also emerged from the election in disarray having registered a dismal showing.  Its leader, the mercurial Faisal Ali Warabe, reneged on his ill-timed pledge before the elections to step down if defeated at the polls.  This inevitably angered many party stalwarts that either saw him as an electoral liability, or were preparing to mount a leadership bid themselves.  Seizing upon this conflict, the Kulmiye government fomented a split within UCID by encouraging and financing a leadership challenge by a disaffected group lead by the Deputy Chairman of the party and Speaker of Parliament, Abdirahman Mohammed Abdullahi ‘Cirro’, even going as far as enabling the dissident, ‘Cirro’ group to storm the central offices of the party in Hargeisa and lock out the group loyal to Faisal, the party’s founder.  The fractious dispute between the two factions of UCID ended up in court which ruled that the ‘Cirro’ group could not simply oust Faisal without holding a party conference.  In the end, the ‘Cirro’ faction left UCID and formed a new opposition party called WADANI which has distinguished itself by not opposing the Kulmiye government, and instead being supportive of many of its most controversial policies.

With UDUB and UCID thus eradicated as a credible political opposition, the Kulmiye government set about removing those elements within the government and the ruling party that could present an obstacle to the unquestioned supremacy of Silanyo and the clique gathered around him.  These elements comprised the perceived political heavyweights of Dr. Mohammed Abdi Gaboose, the Interior Minister, Ahmed Hashi Elmi, Finance Minister and Muse Bihi, the First Deputy Chairman of Kulmiye who had been promised the party nomination for President after Silanyo’s term of office.  These three figures had been crucial to Kulmiye winning the election not only because of their tireless campaigning, but because, even more importantly, they were able to ‘deliver’ their sub-clans for Kulmiye and Silanyo.  However, these were seasoned political players, with both Elmi and Bihi having been key members and leaders of the SNM, while Gaboose had been a cabinet minister under both of the preceding administrations.  Thus, they were not expected to meekly acquiesce to policies or actions that they perceived as damaging to their own political interests.  Neither would they take kindly to being upstaged or being subservient to the clique of largely diaspora-sourced relatives and kinsmen that comprised the clique which wielded power in the Presidency, since they viewed them as upstarts and political neophytes.  The first among the three to see the ‘writing on the wall’ and decide to jump ship was Gaboose who resigned in August 2011 after serving just one year to establish his own party.

In March 2012 Elmi was fired after he refused to back down in a dispute with the Minister of Energy, Water & Mines regarding the proper appropriation and application of monies paid by foreign companies for oil concessions. However Bihi was a different kettle of fish altogether.  Firstly, he was not part of the government since he held no executive position but is instead the de facto head of the Kulmiye Party, thus he posed no direct, immediate threat to Silanyo and the clique surrounding him.  Secondly, before the 2010 election he had secured the public pledge of Silanyo to endorse Bihi’s nomination as Kulmiye’s candidate for President in the next election scheduled for 2015, and he was not going to forego that opportunity by any means.  From the beginning of 2011 until now, Silanyo and his clique have employed every tool at their disposal to induce Bihi to despair of acceding to the top position and leave Kulmiye to no avail.  Indeed, they have gone so far as Silanyo announcing his support for Abdul Aziz Samale, Elmi’s replacement as Finance Minister and a clansman of both Bihi and Elmi, as Kulmiye’s nominee for President at the next election, in direct contradiction of his public pledge to Bihi.  Yet, Bihi refuses to rise to the bait and continues to bide his time.

But perhaps the master stroke of Silanyo and the Kulmiye government in destroying their political opponents was in permitting the establishment of political parties to contest the municipal elections in November 2012.  Every Tom, Dick and Harriet that harboured Presidential ambitions immediately set about establishing a political party and announced that, in addition to their party contesting the municipal elections, they were the nominees for President of their respective political parties – never mind that the Presidential elections were some three years and two elections (municipal and parliamentary) away!  To borrow from Churchill’s famous and historic salute to the RAF in World War II, “never has an electorate witnessed such a naked greed for power exhibited by so many for the benefit of so few”.  For a full calendar year, the people of Somaliland were witness to a ‘tribal’ political circus wherein the vain, the deluded and the outright venal jostled and jousted for media attention and their political support.  Since the newly created parties had no political programs to speak of and were only established as vehicles for the political ambitions of their founders, the appeals for support were inevitably based upon clan affiliation.

Thus, each clan and sub-clan grouping called for and held a “shir beleed” in order to maximise their electoral muscle and so extract optimal concessions from the prospective candidates.  As the ruling party, Kulmiye was more than happy to play this game since they had the largest war chest in the form of the government exchequer and unmatched patronage on offer.  In addition, the municipal elections were held without a proper electoral register since the register prepared for the Presidential elections some two years earlier had been revealed to be seriously flawed with widespread multiple and ‘ghost’ registrations. This fundamental shortcoming was exacerbated by the compromising of the independence of the National Election Commission (NEC) which began to function as an arm of the government.  The municipal elections of 2012 were characterised not only by a large turnout among the electorate but was also peaceful and took place in an atmosphere of celebration.  Nevertheless, there were clear instances of substantial vote rigging, stuffing of ballot boxes and destruction or diversion of entire ballot boxes in certain areas.  Unsurprisingly, Kulmiye won these elections handily and their success was vehemently disputed in various cities and towns, e.g. Hargeisa, Berbera, Gabiley and Borama, with large demonstrations, some of which turned violent and resulted in civilian and police deaths.  In addition to Kulmiye, UCID and WADANI emerged as the other two national political parties qualified to contest the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential elections, while the plethora of other parties and their presumptive Presidential nominees were officially disqualified and politically spent.  It is important to point out here that after much debate the public overwhelmingly chose to stop the street protests, some of which had turned violent, and accept the election results notwithstanding the widespread consensus that the election was deeply flawed and many results were fraudulent.

Finally, it is necessary to briefly comment upon the foreign policy of the Kulmiye government, since the debacle of this ill-conceived misadventure has had an important impact upon domestic Somaliland politics.  The Kulmiye government embarked upon a new approach to foreign affairs whereby it abandoned two of the guiding principles of Somaliland foreign policy since 1992, which were:

Ø  Not to participate in international meetings convened to form so-called ‘governments’ in Mogadishu, or to discuss reconciliation and re-establishment of the state in Somalia, since Somaliland is an independent country and not part of Somalia;

Ø  To open dialogue on matters regarding separation and ‘good neighbour’ relations only with a government in Mogadishu that was legitimate and formed by the people of Somalia through an open and representative process.

Instead, the new government decided to attend international conferences convened to discuss matters concerning reconciliation and re-establishment of the state in Somalia, and the first such conference attended by Somaliland representatives was the Wilton Park Conference convened under the auspices of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office of the UK under the heading – Somalia: Building Stability, Accepting Reality – in February 2011.  Participation at this conference, which caused a great furore inside Somaliland, resulted in a decision brokered by the UK government for Somaliland and Somalia to commence a dialogue to resolve their differences.  Thus, abandonment of the first principle of the country’s long standing foreign policy directly resulted in abandonment of the second principle.  In addition, the Kulmiye government agreed to attend the subsequent international conference for Somalia which was convened by Turkey which had evidenced its desire to play an active role in establishing a permanent government in Somalia, as part of its new assertive foreign policy under Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This was the Second İstanbul Conference on Somalia on 31 May/1 June 2012 under the heading – Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015.

The first two rounds of talks between Somaliland and Somalia were undertaken with the TFG of Sheikh Sharif in London and Dubai respectively in June 2012, with the first meeting at ministerial level and the subsequent on in Dubai between the two Presidents. While these meetings were dubbed ‘historic’ and they each concluded with important-sounding documents, i.e. the Chevening Declaration and the Dubai Statement respectively, they did not accomplish anything of significant consequence and no agreements were reached on the major issues between the two parties.  Indeed Ambassador David Shinn’s apposite characterisation of the former applies equally to both, “The Chevening House Declaration is unexceptional. It primarily commits both sides to continue the dialogue and cooperate in the fight against terrorism, extremism, crime, piracy, illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping. Importantly, however, it suggests that both sides are willing to continue the talks.”  Simply put, the two sides agreed to continue talking.  However, since there was no agenda set regarding the issues to be discussed, the talking could presumably continue ad infinitum without any matters of substance being discussed.  Talking for the sake of talking is but an empty expenditure of CO₂.

Notwithstanding this, it can be argued that opening a dialogue with Somalia is in of itself a positive step since such a dialogue will need to eventually take place – after all the two sides have many issues to discuss and resolve among themselves such as equitable division of the assets and liabilities of the erstwhile Republic with international organisations, creditor nations and international banks; disposition of the properties of their citizens in the others’ territory; among many others.  However, the decision to commence the dialogue with a lame-duck, transitional government that had only two months remaining of its term of office and therefore could not commit to any substantive agreements did not seem wise or carefully considered.  Further, the decision of the Kulmiye government to support the candidacy of Sheikh Sharif for the Presidency of the new, supposedly permanent government sponsored by the ‘Donor’ Powers, and more importantly to be perceived by the other candidates as supporting Sharif, was not only ill-advised but has proven to be counter-productive, since Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud won.  Mohamoud has demonstrated his ire with the Kulmiye government by deliberately seeking to undermine them in a variety of ways which have unnerved the Somaliland administration, principal among which has been his repeated and vehement declarations affirming the inviolability of Somalia’s territorial integrity and insistence that Somaliland remains part of Somalia.  Mohamoud has also appointed several high profile Somaliland opponents of the Kulmiye government to his cabinet, in particular Ms Fowzia Adan, Deputy PM & Foreign Minister.

The Dam-ul-Jadid Government

The success of Hassan Mohamoud in the election for the ‘permanent’ government for Somalia hastily cobbled together by the ‘Donor’ Powers in September 2012 was a shock to many, particularly the UN, the ‘Donor’ Powers themselves, the Kulmiye government in Hargeisa and, perhaps most of all to Sharif Hassan.  It was widely assumed that Sharif Hassan would win a handy victory as the most well-known of the candidates and also because he had the advantage of incumbency with all the assets that this position afforded, i.e. funds and patronage.  What the observers anticipating a Sharif victory had failed to grasp was the depth of revulsion among the vast majority of ordinary Somalis at the level of corruption, duplicity and indifference bordering upon cruelty to which his administration had sunk.  Sharif personally had transformed himself from the pious, humble and retiring imam who shunned shaking women’s’ hands in public who took office in 2009, into a slick, designer-suit clad, globe-trotting leader who revelled in being welcomed by ululating women dancers singing his praises.  In addition, he had lost the support of the man that had effectively rescued him from Al-Shabaab by spiriting him away from Eritrea (where he had sought sanctuary after initially fleeing to Kenya from the invading Ethiopians after the short period of UIC control over much of Somalia when he had emerged as national political figure) to Qatar, and eventually to Djibouti.  This was none other than Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, the canny Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament who had become the principal power broker in the TFG.

Mohamoud and his Dam-ul-Jadid (DuJ) organisation were able to seize upon this widespread and well justified public revulsion with the Sharif government to win the Presidency with widespread public support amid an atmosphere of hope that Somalia was experiencing a new beginning.  This hope was fostered in large part by the military successes of the African troops (AMISOM) against the Al-Shabaab nihilists and its eviction from Mogadishu and much of the surrounding countryside.  The declared intention of the ‘Donor’ Powers to recognise the new government as the permanent and legitimate government of the country and that they (the ‘Donor’ Powers) would accord it such status and provide to it substantial financial, political and military aid also contributed to the optimism and hope for the future among the people of Somalia, within and outside the country.  Mohamoud had little or no political experience prior to his elevation to the Presidency of Somalia and his professional experience was as an academic and as a local officer for international NGOs.  Thus he assumed the Presidency with a ‘clean slate’ as regards domestic Somali politics.

He is a member of Dam-ul-Jadid (New Blood) which is an Islamist political organisation tied to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (MB); indeed it is reported that prior to entering politics Mohamoud had ties to Al-Islah which is the Somali wing of the MB, with which he conducted various charitable activities, particularly in the educational sector.  Mohamoud and his DuJ government, however, quickly squandered the outpouring of hope and optimism for the future by embarking upon a ham fisted and exclusionary approach to governance that alienated many of the other political actors in the country.  Mistakenly and unwisely, operating on the assumption that the designation of ‘permanent’ government by the ‘Donor’ Powers and being accorded the diplomatic courtesies of such status enabled them to impose their will upon all other the domestic political actors, the DuJ government demanded their unquestioning acquiescence and obeisance.  The inevitable result was to engender opposition to their arrogance and elicit defiance to their toothless commands for obedience.  This opposition to their insistence upon government from Mogadishu to which the regions were but outposts of central authority quickly materialised in Puntland and Galmudug which were well established regional states that evidenced a level of self-government that Mogadishu could only aspire to. 

However, it is in Jubbaland, the deep south, inter-river region where the clash between the DuJ’s authoritarian ambitions and the autonomy aspirations of the regional government took the most ominous turn.  Here, in a calculated effort to impose its will on the region and its people, the DuJ government instigated armed clashes between the militia of the regional government of Jubbaland and a clan militia loyal to the DuJ.  The willingness of Mohamoud and his colleagues to foment tribalism to the point of the outbreak of clan warfare among its own citizens evidences the bankruptcy of its concept of governance and the myopia of its vision.  Further, the regional government in Jubbaland has an alliance with Kenya to the south to confront Al-Shabaab and exclude them from the region further complicates the situation, with the DuJ government complaining about Kenyan interference, even as it is seeking Kenyan blessing and support.  Clearly, the concept of political consent as a key driver of representative governance is either completely foreign to Mohamoud and his DuJ government or they have grievously misunderstood it.  No government can govern without the consent of those whom it rules.  Political consent is granted by the governed, not by external powers that have given the fiat to rule.  This consent can be secured by force as is practised by dictatorships and other authoritarian governments or it can be elicited voluntarily as in representative forms of government. 

The DuJ government does not have the capability to secure political consent from its people by force, since it is maintained in office by foreign troops, hence it has no choice but to seek such consent voluntarily.  Further, the DuJ government was conceived as one of national reconciliation and, indeed the harbinger of permanent, representative government in Somalia.  That means, perforce, that it must seek inclusivity and consensus; that it seeks common ground with the largest number of domestic civil and socio-political groups.  Instead, it has instigated the very clan warfare and descent into zero-sum tribalism that its creation was advertised as nullifying.  The ‘Donor’ Powers that sired this ‘government’ are either supportive of this unconscionable assault on its own citizens by the DuJ government or they are callously and studiously ‘looking the other way’.  While they publicly state that the conflict in Jubbaland “should be resolved peacefully” and disingenuously “call on all sides to show restraint”, the truth is that the principal instigator is their creation and exists only at their pleasure, hence a simple and clear directive to Mohamoud and his cohorts to desist from armed insurrection against the Jubbaland government would suffice to stop the clan war.

It seems that Mohamoud and his government have yet to learn this lesson, and until they do their government is doomed to fail and Somalia is doomed to repeat its recent history of division and anarchy.  Such failure will give succour and space to the nihilists of Al-Shabaab as well as embolden the territorial ambitions of Kenya and Ethiopia to carve out ‘buffer zones’ in Somalia to the south and the west respectively.  These ‘buffer’ zones are already in place, but under the control of Somali regional authorities; however in a free-for-all with competing warlords vying for power it is likely that Ethiopia and Kenya will choose to take control over these zones directly with their own troops.

The ‘Donor’ Powers & Albion’s Lead

Since mid-2010 the Western Powers, and particularly the US, has let Britain take the lead with respect to policy towards Somalia.  This is somewhat understandable as Britain was the colonial power in the British Somaliland Protectorate (present day Somaliland), and was the last colonial power that governed the entire Somali-populated area in the Horn of Africa (with the exception of Djibouti) at the end of World War II until 1949.  This post-2010 period was marked by a determined push by the Western Powers to minimise their involvement in Somalia and the British were happy to take the lead in delivering this objective.  In early 2011 AMISOM troops began to undertake offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and by August had driven the nihilist from Mogadishu.  The ‘Donor’ Powers, led by Britain, decided to take this opportunity to diminish their engagement in Somalia and commence the process to justify this withdrawal from Somali affairs in the context of the establishment of a ‘permanent’ government in Mogadishu.  Accordingly, a process was quickly cobbled together under the heading “Roadmap for the End of Transition” whereby a constitution and national ‘parliament’ were hastily established under sustained pressure from the ‘Donor Powers’ and the UN under a tribal/clan participation formula dubbed 4.5.  What is important to note with respect to this process is that it was devised and implemented to fulfil the objectives of foreign powers to wind down their involvement in Somalia and not, as mendaciously presented to the world, to meet the requirements of establishing a genuine government of national reconciliation in which the people of Somalia had true ownership.

Britain, with the UN as hand maiden, was tasked with stage managing this circus of a ‘constitutional’ process for the establishment of a ‘permanent’ government in Somalia through the machinations of succeeding forums of chosen ‘representatives’, e.g. the National Constituent Assembly of elders which rubber-stamped a constitution essentially written by foreigners, and the Technical Selection Committee which vetted and approved the candidates for the federal parliament.  Any member of these forums that proved recalcitrant to the wishes of the ‘Donor’ Powers ran the risk of being labelled a ‘spoiler’ and thus removed from proceedings and banned from political office in the future.  If ever there was an overtly imperial-driven process of state and government formation anywhere in the world, this was it, and Britain as the pre-eminent imperial power of the 18^th, 19^th and 20^th centuries was uniquely qualified to shepherd it to its logical and inevitable conclusion of seeming success and actual failure. Even as it was deftly managing this circus of government creation under the ‘big top’ of the international media, Britain was wooing the new Kulmiye government in Somaliland with promises of increased aid in order to bring it into line with its plans for a federal Somalia.

The Kulmiye government, anxious to demonstrate its difference from its predecessors and its new vision of foreign policy, proved receptive to the overtures of Britain.  Thus it agreed to attend conferences held to map the future of Somalia as an autonomous territory, while Somalia was the recognised nation-state.  The Kulmiye government erroneously thought that this would demonstrate their flexibility and worldly-wise style of diplomacy, while Britain took this attitude to demonstrate Somaliland’s flexibility with respect to the issue of sovereignty.  Truly, this was classic example of the deaf talking to the mute!  This mutual and farcical incomprehension came to head recently when Nicholas Kay, the new, British UN Special Representative for Somalia, came to Somaliland to meet the Kulmiye government in order to facilitate the opening of UNSOM’s office in Hargeisa, only to be roundly and publicly rebuffed to his deep chagrin.  Whatever the Kulmiye government may or may not have wanted to do, the simple fact is that no government in Hargeisa can survive if it is not clearly and unequivocally committed to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somaliland – this is a basic precept of Somaliland politics and the principal ethos underlying Somaliland’s existence.

Conclusion

The whirlwind that these three key players in Somali politics have unleashed upon the neighbouring countries of Somaliland and Somalia is the rise of tribalism and the primacy of clan identity in politics.  Most foreign observers do not fully understand the true danger of increased clan sectarianism in Somali politics.  This danger is the de-legitimisation of national government as ordinary people increasingly withdraw their consent from the centre to the clan and the sub-clan.  Because of the unique common culture, language and identity among the people, Somali politics is often characterised as subject to competing trends of fusion and fission.  Clearly, in both Somaliland and Somalia, politics is experiencing a severe and sustained period of fission which has been exacerbated, if not actually instigated, by the policies and actions of the Kulmiye and DuJ governments respectively.  Further, both governments are suffering from a loss of legitimacy and resultant instability in large part due to the virulent and highly contagious tribal virus they have unleashed.

In Somalia, the establishment of the supposed ‘permanent’ government was intended to be the first step towards the rehabilitation of the shell of a country which has become the very definition of a ‘failed state’ and the rebuilding of state institutions so that reconstruction of the physical and social infrastructure could commence.  Instead we have witnessed, and are witnessing, a reversion to warlord-dominated clan warfare instigated by the DuJ government with the willing or silent connivance of the ‘Donor’ Powers.  Mohamoud and his colleagues have demonstrated the callous cruelty and indifference to the plight of their people that dethroned the Sharif’s TFG and brought them to power.

The ‘Donor’ Powers, acting through their chosen overseer – Britain in true ‘Perfidious Albion’ mode –, continue to exacerbate this situation by forcing through a process of installing a supposedly permanent government in Somalia that is weak, yet seeks to impose its will upon more legitimate and stronger regional governments, with no roadmap for effective governance.  The prospects for the future of the DuJ government are very dire indeed since the conflicts with Jubbaland and other regional governments herald the re-emergence of the warlord era and greater involvement in Somali politics by both Ethiopia and Kenya, which will inevitably diminish the power and legitimacy of Mogadishu. Overlaying this dismal and depressing tableau is the spectre of the re-emergence of Al-Shabaab as a more effective fighting force, now that it’s internal and leadership conflict has been settled at the barrel of a gun in true jihadi fashion.

In Somaliland, Britain has wooed the Kulmiye government on the basis of insincerity regarding its true intentions with respect to the central, and defining, wish of its citizens, i.e. independence.  The fact that the Kulmiye government went so far up the garden path leading to a federal Somalia with perfidious Albion has called into question its nationalist credentials, not to mention its veracity and its wisdom.  For the Kulmiye government, the writing is on the wall, but the maturity of the people in electing to wait out its term over mass protests with respect to the fraudulent municipal elections bodes well for the survival of Somaliland’s experiment in representative government.  Indeed, it is likely that Kulmiye as apolitical party will suffer the splits and demise that has befallen UDUB and that Kulmiye so cleverly orchestrated for UCID.  What does not bode well for the future, however, is the debasement and coarsening of political debate and competition that has reverted to the pre-constitution era of naked tribalism and the primacy of clan and sub-clan identity over the national imperative. 

Ahmed M.I. Egal

July 2013

Somalia – The End Game
Re-establishing the State in Somalia & Securing the Horn of Africa


Introduction
The present situation in Somalia appears to mark a new nadir in the recent history of this sorry country that has been the very definition of a failed state over the last eighteen years. The so-called government, the Ethiopian sponsored Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Abdillahi Yusuf, established in Embagathi in Kenya in 2004 by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), has collapsed for all intents and purposes. Yusuf’s recently announced dismissal of Hassan Nur Adde, the Hawiye Prime Minister, has effectively negated any role for Yusuf in the reconciliation process which is supported by Ethiopia, the AU, UN, EU and US. Yusuf seems determined to end the tenure of his TFG by removing himself as a positive figure in the search for peace and reconciliation. He has made it clear that, far from being an asset in the reconciliation process, he is actively engaged in derailing it in the interest of pursuing his deranged vision of personal power and Darod hegemony. Surely, this final act of political irresponsibility must sound the death knell on his continued leadership of the TFG and tenure as President.

The jihadist nihilists of Al-Shabaab under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys, which is the Al-Qaeda franchise in the Horn of Africa, has captured much of the country and is on the rise against government and Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia has finally accepted the bitter truth that many Somalis and others had predicted, i.e. that Abdillahi Yusuf was an extremely poor choice as the leader to effect reconciliation and establish a government accepted by the broad majority of the Somali people. Finally, the international community has run out of ideas to resolve the Somalia tragedy and the impending, threatened withdrawal of Ethiopian troops promises increased anarchy and the possible accession to power of Al-Shabaab.

Notwithstanding this gloomy and dire picture, it is the thesis of this paper that the current situation presents a window of opportunity to establish a credible government in Somalia and decisively defeat both the jihadists of Al-Shabaab and the tribal supremacists of Abdillahi Yusuf. The principal reasons underlying our conviction that such a window exists are:
1. The political and military divisions within Somalia have coalesced into broader, clan-based groupings which are more amenable to indigenous political reconciliation efforts based upon cultural traditions.
2. The fatigue of the international community in cobbling together so-called governments for Somalia from warlords, their political cohorts, apologists and a sprinkling of token civil society representatives leaves it with no alternative but to seriously consider and support indigenous, grass-root initiatives proposed by Somalis themselves.
3. The recent attacks in Somaliland by Al-Shabaab has forced the people and authorities of that as yet unrecognised country to accept that they cannot continue to remain detached from the search for a solution to the crisis in Somalia.

A Somali Perspective on the Current Situation
The conventional wisdom of foreign observers explains the current situation as follows:
• The TFG of Abdillahi Yusuf has effectively collapsed, with President Yusuf and Premier Hassan Nur Adde engaged in a power struggle over the reconciliation talks in Djibouti between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) lead by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Yusuf is implacably opposed to these talks and the power-sharing formula arrived therein aimed at bringing the ARS into the government, while Nur Adde has long sought such a compromise and indeed personally negotiated the power sharing formula with Sheikh Sharif.
• Yusuf has lost the support of Ethiopia which is crucial to his maintaining his position as the undisputed leader of the TFG. Recent statements by Meles Zenawi, Premier of Ethiopia, at IGAD meetings and elsewhere, have clearly shown that the Ethiopian government has lost patience with the TFG and Yusuf in particular. In particular, Zenawi’s praise of the ARS and obvious support for the Nur Adde/Sheikh Sharif power-sharing agreement reached in Djibouti seems to sound the death knell for Yusuf’s continued supremacy and indeed tenure.
• Ethiopia has been forced to accept the hard truth that they cannot maintain Yusuf and the TFG in ‘power’ by force any longer, and Zenawi is actively searching for an exit strategy that will not result in the country falling further into anarchy with the concomitant assumption of power by Al-Shabaab.
• Faced with the agreement between Nur Adde (representing the TFG) and Sheikh Sharif, Al-Shabaab split from its erstwhile ally in the ARS, namely Sharif’s UIC, denounced the power-sharing agreement as an Ethiopian plot and stepped up its military campaign against the Mogadishu regime. The Al-Shabaab has scored dramatic successes on the ground as the TFG became increasingly consumed by its internal power struggle and as the Ethiopian forces have hunkered down and focused upon holding the major metropolises of Mogadishu and Baidowa.

While this characterisation is a reasonable depiction of the current situation in Somalia, it completely misses the local, political and clan dynamic and so fails to illuminate the crucial opportunities and pitfalls inherent at this juncture in Somalia’s descent into hell. It is our view that the current situation is very different from that which prevailed some five years ago when the ill-fated TFG was established in Embagathi. Indeed, the present situation is also markedly different from that which pertained when the Ethiopian invasion ousted the UIC from power and dashed the hopes which the brief period of peace ushered in by the UIC’s stunning success in routing the warlords. The salient opportunities and pitfalls which characterise the current situation in Somalia can be summarised as follows:

I. The political divisions in Somali society have broadly coalesced into clan groupings as compared with the atomisation of these divisions into sub-sub-clan and family groupings levels of the previous period. In the previous phase of anarchy which characterised the Somali political situation, before the rise of the UIC, the predominant politico-military unit was the family grouping as individual family units sought to protect themselves and their land/houses or villages and possessions from others. By contrast, the situation now is characterised by allegiance to the sub-clan as political divisions have become coloured both by anti-Ethiopian nationalism and also by Yusuf’s naked tribalism.

This fission/fusion dichotomy is a core feature of Somali clan politics which is central to a comprehensive understanding and analysis of same. The Ethiopian invasion engendered deep feelings of nationalism given the age-old hostility between Muslim, pastoral Somalis and the Christian, agrarian Abyssinians. The nationalism engendered by the Ethiopian invasion is clearly a fusion factor in counterpoint to the fission dynamic which prevailed in the previous, pre-UIC period. Another, more subtle, factor militating for fusion is the naked tribalism of President Yusuf when he put his clansmen exclusively in charge of the security and armed services. With Ethiopian forces protecting his regime, he arrogantly presented himself as a Darod ruler imposing his imprimatur upon the largely Hawiye population of Mogadishu and its environs, in an incomprehensible and incredibly insensitive throwback to the Siyad Barre regime. Yusuf, true to his political past as the tyrant of the Majerteyn-based SSDF of the 1970s/80s and later of the Majerteyn enclave of Puntland, sought to re-establish Darod political hegemony in Somalia under his leadership, which inevitably impelled the fusion dynamic in Hawiye political divisions.

II. It is a political fact of life that one of the most important reasons underlying the anarchy that has prevailed in Somalia since 1991, has been that the largest clan, the Hawiye, has fractured politically and militarily into its various sub-clans. By contrast, for example, the peace and stability in Somaliland to the north can be largely explained by the conscious decision of the Isaaq, the largest clan in that country, to re-establish the Somaliland state as a representative democracy with constitutional guarantees for minority rights. The political divisions among the Hawiye now have reverted largely to those that pertained at the time that Siyad Barre was expelled, with one critically important difference, which we shall discuss below. The core Hawiye political division today is between the Habr Gidir and Abgal sub-clans, which are the two largest sub-clans of the Hawiye, with most of the smaller sub-clans, e.g. Murursade, Hawadle etc., lining up with the Abgal. Al-Shabaab is dominated by Dahir Aweys’ Habr Gidir sub-clan, while the UIC is the vehicle of Sheikh Sharif’s Abgal and their allies and the Abgal are also predominant in the TFG since Hassan Nur Adde is from the Abgal sub-clan.

It is important to point out that this coalescence in Hawiye intra-clan politics is not a simple, cut and dried process. In fact some important Habr Gidir figures support the Nur Adde/Sheikh Sharif concordat, e.g. Abdul Salat Qasim – the previous President of the Transitional National Government (TNG), while the Ogaden ONLF, which is of the Darod clan of Abdillahi Yusuf makes common cause with Al-Shabaab in its war against Ethiopia. Despite of these exceptions, the fact remains that the internal intra-Hawiye political divisions have largely reverted back to those that pertained after the expulsion of Siyad Barre, when they were divided between the Habr Gidir lead by Mohammed Aideed and the Abgal lead by Ali Mahdi. The significant and crucial difference now is that the smaller Hawiye sub-clans have lined up with the Abgal, whereas previously each sub-clan had established its own militia to protect its own interests and territory, while forming tactical, ad-hoc alliances with other groups as the need arose. Thus, the crucial difference between the current situation in Somalia and that which prevailed in 1991/93 is that the dynamic in intra-clan politics now is fusion driven while in the earlier period it was fission driven. It is important to note here that the allegiance of the Habr Gidir to Al-Shabaab is neither ideological nor theological, but essentially tactical in response to the Ethiopian invasion and Yusuf’s ignorant reversion to the empty dream of Darod hegemony.

III. The recent suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab in Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, have brought the anarchy of Somalia to Somaliland which had been immune to it until this November. Since the Somali National Movement (SNM) defeated Siyad Barre’s forces and evicted them from the ex-British Protectorate of Somaliland in 1991, Somaliland had studiously remained aloof from the political machinations and manoeuvrings by domestic and foreign actors to establish a government for Somalia. Having declared the union between Somalia and Somaliland null and void, and thereby reasserted its independence from Somalia in 1991, the people of Somaliland were united in their determination to play no part in the disputes and jockeying for power between the various actors in Somalia. As far as they are concerned, Somalia is now a separate country for which significant animosity remains in the collective psyche and they are determined to remain detached from the struggle for dominance between the competing forces there.

The November suicide bombings of the Presidential compound, the Ethiopian embassy and the UNDP compound in Hargeisa has called this policy of aloofness to political events in Somalia into question. While previous so-called governments of Somalia had insisted that Somaliland was an integral part of Somalia, Somaliland had ignored these statements since these regimes had no authority or influence over Somaliland or its people. Now, however, one of the factions vying for control of Somalia has effectively declared war upon Somaliland and the government in Hargeisa with absolutely no provocation. Somaliland has discovered, in a particularly brutal attack that cost over twenty innocent lives, that its neutrality in the struggle for control of Somalia is not reciprocated by at least one of the belligerents. Thus, Somaliland is left with no alternative but to take an active role in the search for a solution to the anarchy resulting from the collapse of the state in Somalia, if it is to protect its own peace and stability.

At this point it is important to point out that the most successful militia in the history of Somalia and Somaliland has been the SNM, which fought and defeated the Somali army and the Zimbabwean and South African mercenaries that Siyad Barre had retained to pilot his war planes and lead his soldiers. It is worth remembering that the Somali army which the SNM defeated was, at that time, the second largest and among the most battle hardened in black Africa. Among the SNM’s innovations in its decade long war against the Somali army was the mounting of artillery and anti-aircraft guns on 4X4 pick-ups, which they used to devastating effect as tank-killing battle wagons. These novel and terrifying weapons came to be known as “technicals”, and they have entered the lexicon of modern guerrilla warfare throughout Africa and the world. Finally, many of today’s principal warlords in Somalia, e.g. Morgan, Qanyare Afrah, Dahir Aweys, were senior officers in the Somali army that the SNM routed. Many of the key commanders of the SNM, not to mention many thousands of the young guerrillas they commanded, form the present Somaliland National Army, while still others are civilian citizens leading ordinary lives after having been demobilised.

The vast majority of ordinary people in Somalia, not to mention their traditional clan elders, admire Somaliland for the tangible and sustained achievement that its people have achieved during the last eighteen years with respect to national reconciliation and the establishment of peace, representative government and the rule of law. This is evidenced by the fact that some 200-250,000 refugees from Somalia live and work in Somaliland, principally in Hargeisa, Burao and Borama. Somaliland and its authorities (particularly the clan elders and religious leaders) command great respect and moral authority with the ordinary people of Somalia, since they are seen as the principal architects of Somaliland’s success at national reconciliation and effective, representative government. These authorities have been compelled to remain resolutely aloof from the internal strife in Somalia due to the strong popular antipathy in Somaliland to any notion of going back into a political union with Somalia in any form, despite several approaches during the last decade by various actors from Somalia for Somaliland authorities to act as ‘honest broker’ mediators among competing factions in Somalia.



The Way Forward – Towards A Somali Solution
As with any other difficult and intractable problem, an effective approach to crafting a solution to the Somalia crisis must focus upon maximising the positive factors and minimising the negative ones. This means, firstly, seeking to achieve a broad Hawiye reconciliation aimed at achieving a real and tangible Hawiye political consensus. This is absolutely fundamental to establishing a credible government in Somalia that has genuine popular support since, as stated earlier, it will be impossible to establish such a government without the active support of the majority community in the country. The centrality and importance of this requirement cannot be over estimated since its achievement will form the foundation upon which the broader, national reconciliation between the different clans and community groups will rest. The impetus towards fusion in Hawiye intra-clan politics over the last five years in the face of Yusuf’s naked Darod tribalism and the Ethiopian invasion is a clear and distinct political and psychological support factor that must be capitalised upon.

In order to promote Hawiye reconciliation, it will be necessary to convene a caucus of the elders and representatives of all the Hawiye clans, preferably on the sidelines of a national reconciliation conference of all the clans and community groups of Somalia. The fact that the major political divisions within the Hawiye clan have reverted to the Habre Gidir vs. Abgal et al axis is an important factor that will considerably facilitate this process. Habr Gidir leaders, such as Abdul Salat Qasim, which are willing to participate in the reconciliation process, must be incorporated in this conference. It is important to understand that the vast majority of the Habr Gidir sub-clan are not committed jihadists, but have gravitated to support of the Al-Shabaab for two principal reasons.

Firstly, the Al-Shabaab is the most effective anti-Ethiopian militia in the country, and Ethiopia’s brutal occupation of Somalia in support of Yusuf’s naked tribalism has inflamed traditional, anti-Ethiopian nationalism among all Somalis. Secondly, the deposition of Salat Qasim and his replacement by an Abgal axis around Nur Adde and Sheikh Sharif has driven many Habr Gidir militias into the arms of Al-Shabaab for clan solidarity and protection in age-old Somali tradition. Accordingly, it is critical for the success of intra-Hawiye reconciliation that these young fighters of the Habr Gidir militias be weaned away from the toxic lures of Al-Shabaab tribalism and jihadism. This can only be achieved by incorporating genuine Habr Gidir leaders, political as well as traditional and religious, into a genuine reconciliation among all the Hawiye sub-clans. The Somaliland elders and religious leaders are the ideal intermediaries to accomplish this task since they comprise a trusted and traditional interlocutor that is accepted by both parties as a neutral “honest broker”.

The second critical factor in this process relates to the rehabilitation of the Darod clan and its integration into a new Xeer (or social contract as defined by Rousseau) for the re-establishment of Somalia as a nation-state. In order to understand the background and importance of this element of the process, it is necessary to very briefly outline the background of the Darod clan in Somali political history over the last half century. Due to the colonial division of the Somali people and the territories they inhabit, the Darod clan does not constitute a majority in any of the political units which became modern nation-states, i.e. Somaliland, Somalia or Djibouti. However, they form the majority in the Northwest Frontier District (NFD) and they comprise the largest clan (although not the numerical majority) in the Haud & Reserved Area, which were ceded by the British to Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. In Somalia, the Majerteyn sub-clan of the Darod managed to secure a dominant political position during the colonial era through their more willing embrace of the education services provided by the Italians, and the concomitant access to colonial service job opportunities this afforded them. Majerteyn dominance of the colonial service also translated into enhanced patronage in trade and commerce which was a traditional strength in view of their coastal heritage.

Indeed, by the time of independence in 1960 the Majerteyn sub-clan dominated the leadership of the Somali Youth League (SYL) – the independence party of Somalia – as well as the Civil Service, the Police & National Army, the Legislative Assembly and the business community. Through a sustained pattern of migration, particularly during the ten year period (1950-1960) that Somalia was a UN Trust Territory administered by Italy, the Majerteyn emerged as significant numerical constituencies in regions such Kisimayu and Benadir, which are far removed from their traditional home around Cape Guardafui on the Horn. Majerteyn political dominance in Somalia at that time is evidenced by the fact that the two first Prime Ministers of the Somali Republic, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and Abdirazak Haji Hussein, were both Majerteyn as was the first National Police Chief, Mohammed Abshir. In addition, Abdirashid A. Shermarke went on to become President after the government lead by his clansman, Abdirazak H. Hussein lost the general election in 1967. This Darod domination of Somali politics was taken to its logical and ultimately destructive phase under the dictatorship of Siyad Barre, which did not try to disguise its deliberate and calculated mission of tribal hegemony.

A critical, indeed one could say the fundamental, conflict underlying the anarchy in Somalia during the last eighteen years is the struggle for power between the Hawiye and the Darod. Despite being the majority community, the Hawiye have been unable to prevail because of their internal divisions and also because they have failed to articulate and present a new Xeer that the minority communities, e.g. the Rahanwein, the coastal Arab-Somalis, Barjuns etc., feel protects their interests and which they can, therefore, sign up to. The Darod, for their part, have been engaged in an essentially defensive strategy that seeks to prevent the re-establishment of the state on terms that are disadvantageous to them by promoting Hawiye divisions, while maintaining relative peace and stability in their enclave of Puntland. Abdillahi Yusuf’s successful suborning of Ethiopian aid, support and complicity in his bid for the Presidency of the TFG in Embagathi marked the last, and hopefully final, chapter in this tragedy of Darod insecurity and destructiveness in post-Siyad politics in Somalia. The myopic and very ill conceived decision by the US and Ethiopia initially to support the hated and hateful warlords against the UIC, and then to invade Somalia to install Yusuf and his TFG by force played into the domestic political scene in the most negative manner. Under the umbrella provided by the Ethiopian invasion and US international sponsorship, Yusuf embarked upon his immature and equally ill conceived adventure to re-establish Darod hegemony over government, this time under Majerteyn leadership in replacement of Siyad Barre’s Marehan sub-clan. The inevitable result has been to harden Darod antipathy among the other political and clan groupings in Somalia, hence our use of the characterisation ‘rehabilitation’ with regard to Darod participation in the reconciliation process outlined herein.

With respect to the important issue of Darod participation in the reconciliation process, two key elements need to be developed and pursued simultaneously. The first is the achievement of Hawiye reconciliation in order to minimise the attraction of the previous paradigm of promoting, and even fomenting, intra-Hawiye divisions to maintain the current anarchy. The second is to rehabilitate and re-invigorate the traditional clan leadership, religious leaders and business leaders of the Darod clans, which have been delegitimized and shunted aside by warlords like Yusuf, Adde Muse – the Puntland President – and their pirate-baron henchmen. Just as the Habr Gidir are not rabid jihadists, neither are the Darod a clan of tribal supremacists and Machiavellian manipulators. What is crucial is that the Darod understand that the new Xeer underpinning the re-emergence of Somalia as a nation-state will neither punish them nor afford them any special status. There are many Darod political leaders opposed to Yusuf, Adde Muse and the tribal criminality they present as political leadership, which could be enlisted in this endeavour. These leaders have to convince their clansmen that while the era of political dominance is ended for good, the new Xeer to be promulgated at the conference is their best and only chance to secure their legitimate rights and freedoms in a stable and democratic Somalia.

This issue concerning the rehabilitation of the Darod and successfully incorporating them into the reconciliation process is a very complex and intractable one. As with the effort to reconcile the Hawiye, it needs to be addressed thoroughly and comprehensively at a caucus of all the Darod clans on the sidelines of the conference. Among other matters, this caucus should also address the is Darod role in the search for a just solution to ending the Ogaden irredentism in the 5th Province of Ethiopia. Clearly, the dream of Greater Somalia is truly dead, thus the stated aim of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) of secession from Ethiopia in favour of union with Somalia has effectively become a non-sequiteur. Conversely, the new, federal constitution of Ethiopia provides the people of the 5th Province (Ogaden and non-Ogaden alike) with a significant measure of autonomy, or even full independence along the Eritrean model. As they reassess their political position in Somalia, the Darod also need to reassess their position in the context of a Horn of Africa region of multiple, democratic states where power is increasingly diffused and no single socio-political group can monopolise government. Indeed, all the people of Somalia need to develop and articulate a new political ethos for the future, since the Greater Somalia paradigm which underpinned the creation of the erstwhile Republic of Somalia has now been consigned to history.

Thirdly, the new-found willingness of Somaliland to play an active and constructive role in the search for a solution to the crisis in Somalia must be seized upon and encouraged. The proposed national reconciliation conference can and should be held in Somaliland under the auspices of the Somaliland elders. It is important that the said conference is hosted by the Somaliland elders rather than the Somaliland Government, in order to avoid any perception that the government is meddling in Somalia’s affairs for its own, political ends. It is the practise in Somali culture and tradition for the elders of a neutral, third clan to mediate in a dispute (or war) between two other clans and it is a feature of such traditional mediation for the two disputing clans to agree to accept unconditionally and wholly the arbitration decision of the mediators. This is the model that needs to be adopted and followed and which will be broadly accepted by the vast majority of the Somali public which are clearly fed up with the continued anarchy ushered in by successive so-called governments concocted in foreign capitals.

In order to secure Somaliland’s willing collaboration to host the conference and provide the necessary commitment of political, moral and human resources (e.g. military troops, equipment & materiel), it is essential for Somaliland to obtain clear benefits for its effort. The obvious benefit that Somaliland will seek is international recognition of its statehood. Without a clear and unequivocal commitment from all parties, particularly the Government of Somalia, that Somaliland’s quid pro quo for organising and hosting the conference is international recognition, it will be impossible to secure widespread public support for this conference in Somaliland. To this end, the first step in the arrangement of the conference should be for the governments of Somalia and Somaliland to mutually recognise each other. Another important factor to take into account is the participation of Al-Shabaab in the conference. It is unreasonable to expect Somaliland to agree to Al-Shabaab’s participation in view of the November 2008 attacks in Hargeisa it orchestrated, unless it is willing to surrender all those who were involved in the planning and execution of the said attacks, and pay compensation to the families of the dead and injured. Since it is our view that the only effective way to deal with Al-Shabaab is to deprive it of its main constituency, i.e. the Habr Gidir sub-clan, and then deal with it as a criminal organisation (much as one would deal with the pirate gangs with which it is loosely affiliated), their de facto or de jure exclusion from the conference is not a cause for concern.

For the proposed conference to be credible and in order to secure the willing support of the mass of Somalia’s citizens, it must be open, inclusive and truly representative of all communities and opinions. It must enable the open airing of grievances and the concomitant, but difficult, process of acknowledgement and recognition of past injustice in order to forge genuine reconciliation. The conference envisaged is an amalgam of a ‘Truth & Reconciliation Forum’ along the lines of the South African model and a political convention to select a legislative body and an executive government. The Somaliland elders are uniquely equipped to host and structure such a conference, since they did precisely this in 1993 at Borama to establish the first post-SNM government and legislative assembly for Somaliland. The essentially open, democratic and non-authoritarian nature of the Somali clan structure and political system lends itself very well to such type of conference, as would be expected since this type of conference was designed and structured by clan elders. Thus, its inclusive and open nature works against those who refuse to attend and participate, since their refusal is a repudiation of the traditional, cultural norms of mediation that have characterised Somali society since time immemorial.

Finally, the international community must support this process in tangible ways including, inter alia, the following:
1. The costs of convening and holding the conference must be pledged by the major foreign players, i.e. US, EU, AU, AL.
2. The Ethiopians have to announce the withdrawal of their forces from Somalia once the government formed at the proposed conference is sworn in and is installed in Mogadishu.
3. A peace keeping force comprised of Somaliland forces (which will form the backbone of the said peace keeping force force with a complement of, say 15,000 soldiers), AU and ICO members must be formed and committed to protect aid and relief organisations and supervise the disarming of the militias and the establishment of Somali security services. Western, Arab and Asian countries would provide the equipment, logistical and financial support for this peace keeping force.
4. An international donor conference should be convened as soon as possible after the establishment of the new government to pledge and commit significant funds for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. This conference should also separately pledge funds for Somaliland to support its reconstruction and development.

It is our firm belief that a golden opportunity exists at this time to finally establish a truly representative, inclusive government in Somalia as the logical conclusion of a genuine national reconciliation conference that will lead to the final end of the anarchy and misery that has bedevilled that country. The people of Somalia cannot afford to miss this opportunity, and we are convinced that they are ready to grasp it with both hands, given a chance to do so. We fervently hope that the international community will avail this chance not only to help the people of Somalia to re-establish the state in their country, but also to help the people of the region secure the Horn of Africa from anarchy, starvation and misery and the terrorism and piracy these evils incubate and breed.

Financial Meltdown

I remember a time when the term "voodoo economics" was applied to Reagan's economic policy of tax reductions for the wealthy while running the largest budget deficits & trade deficits America had experienced. We are now witnessing the consequences of G W Bush's "woo-hoo" economic policy of tax reductions for the wealthy while running even larger budget & trade deficits in completely deregulated financial markets. Since banks earn profits principally through the extension of credit, they have gleefully maximised the extension of credit, bringing into the debt pool many millions which were previously excluded due to their inability to service and repay the debt. This madness was camoflaged through the fiction that the debt was secured by mortgaged property which would rise in value, and the low income borrowers were lured with artificially low "teaser" rates for the initial few years of their miracle mortgages. As these "teaser" rates fell away and the real rates kicked in, the new borrowers were forced into default and foreclosure, the housing bubble burst and rude reality kicked in.

Of course, by this time the financial alchemists at the investment banks had already "packaged" the coal of these boring mortgages into the gold of MBSs (mortgage-backed securities) which they had sold to all and sundry, including pension funds that managed the savings & retirement accounts of the very same low income borrowers that had been played for suckers in the first place. When the housing bubble burst and the suckers were being forced into foreclosure and bankruptcy, free-marketeers objected loudly to public money being used to bail out people from their bad economic decisions. Now that falsity of the bankers' alchemy has been exposed and the lustre of their MBSs has been seen for the fools gold that it actually is, their loud cry is for a bail out of the alchemists in the name of maintaining market stability and avoiding a catastrophic recession.

If public money is to be used to bail out the banks by buying their bad MBS assets at book value (as proposed), then the state should take over ownership of these institutions as would be the case if they were taken over by a private company. The state could then sell off the banks to investors after cleaning up their balance sheets and use the funds generated thereby to provide relief to the suckers who were initially duped by the alchemists. This relief would, in turn and over time, raise the value of the MBSs purchased by the state thereby providing it with the prospect of eventually re-selling them responsibly and thereby recover the public money spent to unravel this mess.

Of course, there remain the issues of punishing the alchemists which had sold coal dressed up as gold in order to line their own individual pockets, and of establishing a proper regulatory framework that can and does effectively police the alchemists. After all, if it is illegal to scam people with Ponzi schemes, it should be illegal to scam them with other types of financial alchemy.